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"Sublimity, Ugliness, and Formlessness in Kant's Aesthetic Theory," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 45 (1): 49–56. Roughly, on the view suggested by Moran and Makkai, the claim implicit in a judgment of beauty is not merely the conditional claim that others, if they perceive the object, ought to judge it to be beautiful; it is the unconditional claim that others ought to perceive it and, in so doing, judge it to be beautiful. The first section of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," the "Analytic of the Beautiful," aims to analyse the notion of a judgment of beauty or judgment of taste, describing the features which distinguish judgments of beauty from judgments of other kinds, notably cognitive judgments (which include judgments ascribing goodness to things), and what he calls "judgments of the agreeable." Kant is not explicit about the pretheoretical conception of judgments of beauty which is the subject of his analysis, and there is room for controversy about what does and does not count as a judgment of beauty in Kant's sense. The introduction to the Cambridge edition of the *Critique of Judgment* provides a useful discussion of the historical sources of the work as a whole. Förster (ed.), Stanford: Stanford University Press. As Kant puts it: "how is a judgment possible which, merely from one's own feeling of pleasure in an object, independent of its concept, judges this pleasure as attached to the representation of the same object in every other subject, and does so a priori, i.e., without having to wait for the assent of others?" (§36, 288) The argument constituting Kant's official answer to this question ("Deduction of Taste") is presented in the section entitled "Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments," in particular in sections §831–39, with the core of the argument given at §38, 2.7. The Sublime Kant distinguishes two notions of the sublime: the mathematically sublime and the dynamically sublime. Lorand, R., 1989. Sedgwick (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; reprinted in Guyer (2005). In its identification of the pleasure and the judgment the view is like that of Richard Aquila (1982, see especially 107) and, more recently, Robert Wicks (2007, 43–45); although neither Aquila nor Wicks explicitly endorses the apparent consequence that the pleasure or judgment must involve a claim to one's own universal communicability. The idea of nature is teleologically connected to everything else through relations of outer purposiveness. Beauty serves as the "symbol" of morality (§59, passim), in that a judgment of beauty "legislates for itself"; rather than being subjected to a "normative law of experience" (§59, 353); reflecting feelings of pleasure in the belief that others share them to my own consciousness (§59, 354); see also General Judgment of taste following §9, 482n, 1, p. "The discussion of the 'Deduction of the sublime' has been limited to a few sections of the introduction to the Cambridge edition of the *Critique of Judgment*," Sweet, K., 2009. In this section of *Speculative Aesthetics*, which follows the standard development of higher aesthetic theory, Kant's position is subjected to the following critique: Kant's position is based on the assumption that the pleasure of the sublime can be had in the form of a dilemma; see for example Guyer (1979, p.) Kant's Principles of Reflecting Judgment," in Guyer (2003). Teufel, T., 2011. The "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" contains a number of more specific connections between aesthetics and morality, including the following: Aesthetic experience serves as a propadeutic for morality, in that "the beautiful prepares us to love something even nature, without interest; the sublime, to esteem it, even contrary to our (seemingly) interest" (General Judgment following §29, 267). —, 1994. However, rather than understand the pleasure as awareness of one's own universal communicability, Longuenesse takes it to be awareness of a prior, and independent, feeling of pleasure elicited by the free play of the faculties, so that there are two distinct feelings of pleasure involved in judging an object to be beautiful (2003, 152–155; 2006, pp. See also the references given in the final paragraph of section 2.9, Abaci, U., 2008. Kant's remarks about music in §§51–54 suggest that music might not even qualify as beautiful, as opposed to merely agreeable, art, 417n.39). The rules prescribed by the understanding, are, or correspond to, particular concepts which are applied to the object. The Transcendent Science, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. "Kant's Non-Teleological Conception of Purposiveness," *Kant-Studien*, 102: 232–252. "Kant's Conception of Empirical Law," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 48(4): 410–425. A different kind of objection, based on an appeal to the cognitive role of aesthetic judgment, is made in Pillow (2006). In particular, it distinguishes them from (i) judgments of the agreeable, which are the kind of judgment expressed by saying simply that one likes something or finds it pleasing (for example, food or drink), and (ii) judgments of the good, including judgments both about the moral goodness of something and about its goodness for particular non-moral purposes. Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. —, 2008. "Is the Assumption of a Systematic Whole of Empirical Concepts a Necessary Condition of Knowledge?" *Kant-Studien*, 94: 273–298. A similar position is taken in Kalar (2006, 134), —, 1990b. Thus, as Kant puts it, "it drives us to seek a theology" (§85, 440), and thus serves as a preparation or "propadeutic" to theology (§85, 442). Cohen, A., 2008. One reason to think that the distinction is important is that Kant seems to suggest that all judgments of beauty about representational art are judgments of adherent rather than of free beauty, and hence that they are all impure. The fact that judgments of beauty are based on feeling rather than "objective sensation" (e.g., the sensation of a thing's colour) distinguishes them from cognitive judgments based on perception (e.g., the judgment that a thing is green). Section 3.7 returns to Kant's biological teleology, considering briefly its implications for contemporary biological thought. 2.5 Free and Adherent Beauty This article so far has been concerned only with "pure" judgments of beauty. The claim to universal validity made by a judgment of the sublime rests, not on the universal validity of moral feeling (§29, 255–256). Weatherston, M., 1996. For him, the free play of the faculties manifests the subjective condition of cognition in general (see for example §9, 218; §21, 238; §38, 290), —, 2005a. Aquila, R., 1982. He also says that it is based on a "common sense," defined as a subjective principle which allows us to judge by feeling rather than concepts (§20). In such a situation imagination strives to comprehend the object in accordance with a demand of reason, but fails to do so, —, 2014. Judgment in its determining role subserves given particulars under concepts or universals which are themselves already given. Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Zanetti, V., 1993. Longuenesse maintains that there is a close connection between the "capacity to judge" (*Vermögen zu urteilen*) in that work and the faculty of judgment in the Critique of Judgment, a connection which she summarizes by describing the faculty of judgment as the "actualization" of the capacity to judge in relation to sensory perceptions (1998, 8). Wenzel, C., 1999, 2. Guyer (2003a), Baaz (2005), Caranti (2005) and Hughes (2006; 2007, ch. Sustar, P., 2014. The idea of nature as purposively directed towards the existence of rational beings under moral laws allows us to conceive of an author of nature who is not merely intelligent, but also has the other attributes associated with the traditional idea of God, for example omniscience, omnipotence and wisdom (which includes omnibenevolence and justice) (§86, 444). Such judgments can either be, or fail to be, "pure"; while Kant mostly focusses on the ones which are pure, there are reasons to think that most judgments about art (as opposed to nature) do not count as pure, so that it is important to understand Kant's views on such judgments as well. While aesthetic ideas are discussed only in the sections of the Critique of Judgment which deal with artistic beauty, and not in the "Analytic of the Beautiful," which deals with beauty more generally, Kant remarks parenthetically that natural as well as artistic beauty is the expression of aesthetic ideas (§51, 321). Such an object is the result of design. Kitcher, Patricia., 1990. Hopkins, R., 2001. Moreover, to the extent that the principle is seen as required not only for the construction of systematic scientific theories, but also for the recognition of nature's empirical lawfulness (or even more fundamentally) for the possibility of any empirical conception-formulation at all, it takes on great importance for an understanding of Kant's views on empirical cognition generally. Kant describes an aesthetic idea as "a representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking, though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it" (§49, 314). Must we mean what we say?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. "The Inexplicability of Kant's Naturzweck Kant on Teleology, Explanation and Biology," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 87: 270–311. But, Kant makes clear, the artist's activity must still be rule-governed, since "every art presupposes rules" (§46, 307) and the objects of art must serve as models or examples, that is, they must serve as a "standard or rule by which to judge" (§46, 308). Even in the case of organisms, we must pursue the search for mechanical explanations as far as possible, yet while still recognizing the need for an ultimate appeal to purposes. 2.2 How are Judgments of Beauty Possible? But it is hard to reconcile this understanding of the free play with Kant's appeal to it to justify the legitimacy of judgments of beauty, and more generally his claim to be offering a transcendental account of judgments of beauty, one which shows such judgments to be on a priori principle. Conversely, discussions of Kant's "theory of judgment" have typically taken little or no account of Kant's treatment of judgment in the third Critique, suggesting thereby that Kant's views on judgment are exhausted by his account of cognitive (in particular non-aesthetic) judgments in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Logic. —, 2006. However, approaches along these lines have not figured prominently in the literature on the Deduction. Geiger, I., 2003. The subordination of mechanism to teleology is clarified in §§80–81, in the "Methodology of Teleological Judgment," where Kant connects his views on judgment to the biological controversies of the day, regarding both the origin of the various species of plants and animals, and the origin of individual plants and animals, belonging to already existing species. "Kant on Recognizing Beauty," European Journal of Philosophy, 18(3): 385–413. "Free and Dependent Beauty: A Platypus Issue," British Journal of Aesthetics, 29(1): 32–40. Kant's System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Meerboer (ed.), Atascadero: Ridgeview. Although natural teleology cannot prove the existence of God, it nonetheless has a positive role to play with respect to religion and morality, in that it leads us to ask what the final purpose of nature is, and relatively, to inquire into the attributes of God as author of nature. "Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules," Journal of Philosophy, 108 (5). But then why is it regulative rather than constitutive? "Taste, Conceptuality and Objectivity," Kant Actuel, F. The Sublime in Kant and Beckett: Aesthetic Judgement, Ethics and Literature, Berlin: De Gruyter. "Kant's Theory of Judgment, and Judgments of Taste," Inquiry, 46(2): 146–163, —, 1997. Kulenkampff, J., 1990. "Can Kant's Deduction of Judgments of Taste Be Saved?" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 84: 20–45. "Kritik der Urteilskraft," §76–77: Reflective Judgment and the Limits of Transcendental Philosophy," Kant Yearbook, 1: 143–172. E. In the case of both notions, the experience of the sublime consists in a feeling of the superiority of our own power of reason, as a supersensible faculty, over nature (§28, 261), —, 1993. Although the Critique of Pure Reason includes some discussion of the faculty of judgment, defined as "the capacity to subsume under rules, that is, to distinguish whether something falls under a given rule" (krV A132/B171), it is not until the Critique of Judgment that he treats judgment as a full-fledged faculty in its own right, with its own a priori principle, and, accordingly, requiring a "critique" to determine its scope and limits. Arendt (1982) applies Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment within the sphere of political philosophy; relatedly, Fleischacker (1999) sees connections between aesthetic judgment for Kant and moral and political judgment generally. Judgments of beauty can fall to be pure in two ways, Elliott, R. Shier (1998) argues that it does not, but this has been challenged by Allison (2001), who takes it to be a criterion for a satisfactory interpretation of Kant's theory of taste that it allow for negative judgments of beauty (2001, p. "UNKantian Notions of Disinterest," British Journal of Aesthetics, 32(2): 149–152; reprinted in Guyer (2003). What makes an organism qualify as a natural purpose is that it "is both cause and effect of itself" (§64, 371). Recent work on the historical origins of Kant's aesthetics more specifically includes Zuckert (2007a) and Rueger (2009), both of which emphasize Kant's relation to his rationalist predecessors, and Guyer (2008), which explores the influence of earlier writers on aesthetics in the empiricist tradition. Kant's Arguments in the Analytic and in the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment," British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 17(3): 533–566. Bots (ed.), Boston, D. Another focus of debate concerns the question of whether sublimity, according to Kant, is restricted to objects of nature, or whether it can also be sublimite art, —, 2005. There has been considerable discussion of the relation between the principle of nature's systematicity in Kant's theoretical philosophy and the activity of reflecting judgment in aesthetic experience; see for example Ginsborg (1990a), Pippin (1996), Allison (2001, ch. Fricker (1990), Guyer (2003a) and Steigerwald (2006) relate Kant's view of organisms as natural purposes to his views about reflective judgment more generally. Moreover, it was widely assumed that living beings were made of a different kind of matter from that found elsewhere in the universe; and while some biological theorists rejected this "vitalist" assumption there was, as yet, no experimental evidence against it. (The topic of physicotheology was of concern to Kant throughout his career: Kant proposes a "revised physicotheology" in the Only Possible Argument for the Existence of God (1763), and offers a more far-reaching criticism of physicotheology in the Critique of Pure Reason, at A620/B646Bf) Appeal to natural teleology may justify the assumption of an intelligent cause of nature, but it cannot justify the assumption that this cause has wisdom, unless it is made in expectation, and in particular pre-supposition, of it" (Garrett, 1998). Examples of explicit "Kantian" approaches to teleology include Schäfer, K., 2006. Zinck (2006) explores the free play in terms of the sense of the sublime developed by Kant at §20, which she considers an intensive form of sublimity in contrast to the free play of forms and time. She contrasts this stage of the free play synthesis with the first edition Transcendental Deduction (1790, pp. 6), have claimed that there is such a thing, for Kant, as pure displeasure in the ugly, or comparatively a pure judgment of ugliness. Floyd (1999) and Allison (2001) have argued that there is such a thing, for Kant, as beautiful丑陋, tout court, as well as beautiful tout court, belonging to this or that kind, 140–141. "Kant on Biological Teleology: Towards a Two-Level Interpretation," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (Part C), 37(4): 735–747. In a well-known passage he declares that it is "absurd for human beings... to hope that there may yet arise a Newton who could make conceivable even so much as the production of a blade of grass according to natural laws which an intention has ordered" (§75, 400). Butt, R., 1990, 15. McLeod, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. But it is not clear how such a view is to be justified, 162–164. Beck (ed.), La Sale: Open Court. A useful query is offered by Guyer (2006), who classifies various accounts under three headings: "preconceptive," according to which the play of the faculties is a preconceptual state, falling short of cognition (for example his 1979 account); "multicognitive," in which the free play represents the playful application of a multiplicity of concepts, and thus a kind of cognitive excess (for example Allison 2001); and "metacognitive," in which the manifold is represented as having a unity which goes beyond what is required for cognition; Guyer's own (2006) view, in contrast to his (1979), favours the latter approach. Longuenesse, B., 2003. "Enjoying the Unbeautiful: From Mendelssohn's Theory of Mixed Sentiments" to Kant's Aesthetic Judgments of Reflection," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 67(2): 181–189, 139–147 and pp. 77. Budd (1998) and Allison (2001, ch. "Is Teleological Judgement (Still) Necessary?" is called purposeless because its possibility can only be explained and conceived by us in so far as we assume at its ground a causality in accordance with purposes" (§10, 220). A number of commentators have taken the dilemma, or considerations related to it, to be fatal to Kant's view that judgments of beauty make a legitimate claim to universal validity; see for example Meerboer (1982, cited above) and Guyer (1979, pp. Because of this, the development of moral ideas is the "true propadeutic" for taste (§60, 356). "On Aesthetic Judgement and our Relation to Nature: Kant's Concept of Purposiveness," Inquiry, 49, 547–572. Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment, critical essays, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. The pleasure is "opaque"; while one can come to recognize that one's feeling of pleasure is due to the free play, this is not because the pleasure makes one immediately aware of it, but rather because reflection on the causal history of one's pleasure can lead one to conclude that it was not sensorily or due to the satisfaction of a desire and hence (by elimination) must have been due to the free play. Regarding the historical background to Kant's views on natural teleology, specifically regarding the biology of his time, McLaughlin (1990) remains an excellent guide; more recent work on this topic includes Fisher (2014), Guy (2014), Zuckert (2014a). Kant's early work, Observations on the Sublime and the Beautiful (1764), has, in spite of its title, very little bearing on Kant's aesthetic theory, and is more a work in popular anthropology. For in claiming simply that one likes something, one does not claim that everyone else ought to like it too. Kant, On Understanding Organisms as Natural Purposes," Kant and the Sciences, E. This role coincides with the role assigned to the faculty of judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason; it also appears to correspond to the activity of imagination in its "schematism" of concepts. (In) the aesthetic judgment is represented as purposeful not for imagination or judgment, but for reason (§27, 260) or for the "whole vocation of the mind" (§27, 259). This is seemingly in tension with Kant's reference to music without words as an example of "free beauty" (§16, 229). Huneman, P., 2006. Huneman (2006) discusses the influence of Kant's views on French biology in the nineteenth century; his (2006a) offers a discussion of the wider ramifications of Kant's natural teleology, including its influence on German idealist views of nature and in turn on the thought of Bergson and Merleau-Ponty. 5) Aquila (1991), and Ginsborg (1997a); by far the most developed account is to be found in Zuckert (2007). This article has not addressed the historical origin or reception of Kant's views on aesthetics and teleology, so I mention here some readings which might serve as points of departure for the reader interested in these areas. However, there are reasons to think that contemporary biological theory is no less committed to teleology than its eighteenth-century counterpart, in particular through biologists' use of functional language in their characterizations of the parts and behaviour of organisms. "Kant on Aesthetic and Biological Purposiveness," Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls, A. 178–179, 2006, p. 184–186. Imagination in the free play, he says, conforms to the general conditions for the application of concepts to objects that are presented to our senses, yet without any particular concept being applied, so that imagination conforms to the conditions of understanding without the constraint of particular concepts. The question of the artistic sublime in particular has been raised by Abaci (2008), who defends Kant's restriction of sublimity to nature; Clewiss (2010) defends the opposite view. 3.7 Relevance of Kant's Natural Teleology to Contemporary Biological Theory Kant's writings on natural teleology take for granted the biological theories of his time, which were very different from those of the present day, 49–58, for whom the free play is an activity of schematizing pure concepts without the involvement of empirical concepts. 1). Kant goes into more detail about the notion of a natural purpose which he specifies two conditions that must be met in order to be a natural purpose. Interpreting Kant's Critiques, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 122–123) and Zuckert (2002, 2007, ch. This does not mean that we are entitled, still less required, to ascribe an intentional cause to purposive arrangements in nature, but it does allow us to think of them as standing not only in a mechanical, but also in a teleological order. "The Objectivity of Taste: Hume and Kant," Nous, 24: 93–100. Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant. "Delight in the Natural World: Kant on the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature: Part II: The Sublime in Nature," British Journal of Aesthetics, 38: 233–250; reprinted in Guyer (ed.) 2003. Others have argued that Kant's view can be saved by drawing on considerations not mentioned in the official argument of the Deduction. Another option for defending the argument would be to grasp the first horn, accepting that, on Kant's account, every object can legitimately be judged to be beautiful. (In the terms introduced in Section 3.1, they display "inner objective material purposiveness.") But they are, or must be considered, as products of nature rather than products of conscious design. Prior to this, Section 3.1 outlines Kant's notions of purpose and purposiveness in general and Section 3.2 sketches nature's "purposiveness for our cognitive faculties," i.e., its amenability to empirical scientific enquiry. "The Unity of Kant's 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgement,'" British Journal of Aesthetics, 8(3): 244–259. Arendt, H., 1982. If Kant has already shown, in the Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, that nature is subject to causal laws, then why is there any need for a further principle to account for the recognition of nature as empirically lawful? "Kant, Proust, and the Appeal of Beauty," Critical Inquiry, 38(2): 298–329. The argument in all of its appearances relies on §9, that pleasure in the beautiful depends on the "free play" or "free harmony" of the faculties of imagination and understanding. Cohen, T. 4 and 5); Zuckert offers a sympathetic reading of Kant's formalism (2007, pp. Gammon, M., 1999, 34n), and Beck (1969, 497). Architektonik und System in der Philosophie Kants, H. "Thinking the Particular as Contained Under the Universal," in Kukla (2006). The core of this argument is given in §77, where Kant differentiates two kinds of understanding, a "discursive" understanding of human beings, and a contrasting "intuitive" understanding which (although Kant does not say so explicitly) might be ascribed to God. "Naturalising purpose: From comparative anatomy to the 'adventure of reason,'" Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (Part C), 37(4): 649–674. From the fact that I can demand agreement for the state of my faculties in experiencing an object as, say, green or square, it does not follow that I can demand agreement for a state in which my faculties are in free play, since the possibility of experiencing the free play would seem to require something over and above what is required for cognition alone. Henning, W., 2009. A number of interpreters have recently drawn Kant to propose a solution to the problem, although without necessarily agreeing on what a Kantian solution amounts to. Brandt, R., 1989. 3 of Quaerido (2004). Walsh (2006), Cohen (2007), Breitenbach (2009) and Ginsborg (2014). The Textual Sublime: Deconstruction and Its Differences, H. "Kant Finds Nothing Ugly," British Journal of Aesthetics, 39 (4): 416–422. The notion of purposiveness is divided in the first instance into subjective and objective purposiveness. Kneller, J., 1986. Wenzel, P., 2006. Huneman (2006) discusses the influence of Kant's views on French biology in the nineteenth century; his (2006a) offers a discussion of the wider ramifications of Kant's natural teleology, including its influence on German idealist views of nature and in turn on the thought of Bergson and Merleau-Ponty. 5) Aquila (1991), and Ginsborg (1997a); by far the most developed account is to be found in Zuckert (2007). This article has not addressed the historical origin or reception of Kant's views on aesthetics and teleology, so I mention here some readings which might serve as points of departure for the reader interested in these areas. However, there are reasons to think that contemporary biological theory is no less committed to teleology than its eighteenth-century counterpart, in particular through biologists' use of functional language in their characterizations of the parts and behaviour of organisms. 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their mechanical inexplicability in the relevant sense. On the other hand, Kant's account of the sublime has been influential in literary theory (see Section 2.9 below), and the sublime also plays a significant role in Kant's account of the connection between aesthetic judgment and morality (see Section 2.5 below). "Kant's Aesthetics: Overview and Recent Literature," *Philosophy Compass*, 4 (3): 380–406. "Teleology in Biology: A Kantian Approach," *Kant Yearbook*, 1: 31–56. However, the following simplified scheme may serve as a guide. This strategy is adopted in Savile (1987) and Chignell (2007); Chignell's view differs from Savile's in that it does not make any appeal to moral considerations. Beisbart, C., 2009. The mechanical inexplicability of organisms leads to an apparent conflict, which Kant refers to as an "antinomy of judgment," between two principles governing empirical scientific enquiry. The idea that aesthetic judgment plays a role in grounding the possibility of morality for human beings is suggested at a very general level in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, where Kant describes the faculty of judgment as bridging "the great gulf" between the concept of nature and that of freedom (IX, 195, D, 1970). "The subjective universality of aesthetic judgments revisited," *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 64: 254–258. But reflective judgment is also described as responsible for two specific kinds of judgments: aesthetic judgments (judgments about the beautiful and the sublime) and teleological judgments (judgments which ascribe ends or purposes to natural things, or which characterize them in purposive or functional terms). The fact that we are capable, through reason, of thinking infinity as a whole, "indicates a faculty of the mind which surpasses every standard of sense" (§26, 254). Kant appeals to this account of pleasure in the beautiful in order to argue for its universal validity or universal communicability: to argue, that is, that a subject who feels such a pleasure, and thus judges the object to be beautiful, is entitled to demand that everyone else feel a corresponding pleasure and thus agree with her judgment of taste. "Systematicity and Objectivity in the Third Critique," *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 30 (Supplement): 167–186. Kant is concerned, then, to emphasize both an analogy and a disanalogy between organisms and artifacts. "Teleology and Scientific Method in Kant's Critique of Judgment," *Noûs*, 24: 1–16. "The Problem of Free Harmony in Kant's Aesthetics," Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press. How is it possible to regard one and the same object both as a purpose (hence as something which has been produced as a result of conscious design)? Kant also discusses teleology in two essays about race, "Determination of the Concept of a Human Race" (1785) and "On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy" (1788); both are included in *Anthropology, History, and Education* (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), edited by Gunter Zöller and Robert B. P. 53–54, p. Unless otherwise stated, all references are to the Critique of Judgment, de Man, P., 1990. "The Notion of Blockage in the Literature of the Sublime." Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Text, G. Third, and most important, the various parts of a tree mutually maintain one another's existence and hence maintain the whole tree in existence. Kukla, R. For example, Newton, for all his intellectual power, does not qualify as having genius, because he was capable of making clear, both to himself and others, the procedures through which he arrived at his scientific discoveries (§47, 308–309). McConnell, S., 2008. "Regularity and Constitutive," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* (Supplement), 30: 73–102. Kant characterizes the necessity more positively by saying that it is "exemplary," in the sense that one's judgment itself serves as an example of how everyone ought to judge (§18, 237). In addition to its potential significance for Kant's theory of cognition, the notion of judgment in the third Critique is also important for addressing the interpretive problem of the unity of the Critique of Judgment, in particular, the question of why Kant addresses aesthetics and teleology together in a single work. Ginsburg (1997) criticizes previous approaches and offers an alternative view of the free play derived from her "one-act" reading of the judgment of taste (see Section 2.3). On which what it is for the imagination and understanding to be in free play just is for the subject to be in a perceptual state of mind which involves a nonconceptual claim to its own universal validity with respect to the object perceived, and Evren, S., 2005. —, 1990. Guyer (2001) discusses the way in which Kant's notion of organisms as purposes creates a problem for his conception of science as unified. The second kind of impurity is discussed in §16 in connection with a distinction between "free" [frei] beauty and "adherent" or "dependent" [anhängend] beauty. "Freedom, Happiness, and Nature: Kant's Moral Teleology," in Goy and Watkins (eds.), 2014. While purposiveness in the former sense corresponds to Kant's account of purposiveness at §10 in terms of the notion of design, the notion of purposiveness as it applies to beautiful objects does not involve the idea of real or apparent design, but simply that of the satisfaction of an aim or objective (1979, pp. On the Significance of an Analytic of the Ugly in Kant's Deduction of Pure Judgments of Taste. The question of whether Kant should be interpreted as committed to the objectivity of taste is closely related to the question of whether there can be erroneous judgments of taste; for some discussion see Cohen (1982), pp. "Mechanical Explanation in the 'Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment,'" in Goy and Watkins (eds.) 2014. Most commentators read the relevant paragraphs of §9 as requiring some kind of "two-acts" view, and, at the very least, as distinguishing the free play of the faculties from the judgment of taste proper. —, 2001. Many commentators, including McLaughlin (1990), Allison (1991) and Guyer (2001, 2003a), take organisms to be mechanically as reflecting, or reflective judgment [reflektierende Urteilskraft], is assigned various different roles within Kant's system. Kant's aesthetic theory has also been extensively discussed within literary theory, where there has been particular emphasis on Kant's theory of the sublime. The reception of Kant's biological work is discussed in Lenoir's influential (1980), which argues that Kant's ideas played a major role in shaping German biology in the 1790s. For example, the poet "ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the realm of the blessed, the realm of hell, eternity, creation etc., as well as to make that of which there are examples in experience, e.g., death, envy, and all sorts of vices, as well as love, fame, etc., sensible beyond the limits of experience, with a completeness which goes beyond anything of which there is an example in nature" (*ibid.*, Aylesworth (eds.), Albany: State University of New York Press. (Kant sometimes says that they are natural purposes, and sometimes only that they must be "regarded" or "considered" as natural purposes). Organized beings (or, to use the more modern term, "organisms") are, or must be considered as, purposes because we can conceive of their possibility only on the assumption that they were produced in accordance with design. While judgments of beauty involve a relation between the faculties of imagination and understanding, the faculties brought into relation in a judgment of the sublime are imagination and reason (§29, 266). Kant's Transcendental Deductions, E. —, 2009. Cavell (1976, ch. Payne, "Feeling and Freedom: Kant on Aesthetics and Morality," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 48: 137–146; reprinted in Guyer (2001). "Organisms" and Metaphysics: Kant's First Herder Review," in Goy and Watkins (eds.) 2014. It is described as responsible for various cognitive tasks associated with empirical scientific enquiry, in particular, the classification of natural things into a hierarchical taxonomy of genera and species, and the construction of systematic explanatory scientific theories. 4; 1990a) takes it to be a condition of empirical judgment, not just of judgments based on inductive inference. But if it is not, then the central inference does not seem to go through. Some commentators, for example Ginsburg (2003, pp. 3.3 Organisms as Natural Ends in §§64–65 of the Analytic of Teleological Judgments, Kant introduces the notion of a "natural purpose" or "natural end" [Naturzweck] and argues both that "organized beings," that is, plants and animals, instantiate the concept of a natural purpose and also that they are the only beings in nature that do so (§65, 376). The claim is challenged by Ginsburg (1992), who defends the subjectivity of taste on the grounds that Kant does not allow that we can make judgments of beauty on the basis of hearsay, but must "subject the object to our own eyes" (§8, 5215–216); a similar point is made in Hopkins (2001), and there is further discussion of aesthetic testimony in Gorodeisky (2009). Some commentators try to make sense of the free play by appealing to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience, for example to the kind of experience involved in appreciating an abstract painting, where the subject might imaginatively relate the various elements of the painting to one another and perceive them as having an order and unity which is non-conceptual; see for example Bell (1987, p. 2.2 Nature's Purposiveness for Our Cognitive Faculties Kant claims in the Introductions to the Critique of Judgment that it is an a priori principle of reflecting judgment that nature is "purposive for our cognitive faculties" or "purposive for judgment." This principle is, in the terminology of the Critique of Pure Reason, regulative rather than constitutive. McLaughlin's (2001) book on functional explanation, while not explicitly proposing a Kantian approach draws on Kant at several points. Kant's solution to this apparent paradox is to postulate a capacity, which he calls "genius" by which "nature gives the rule to art" (§46, 307). In the case of the mathematically sublime, the displeasure comes from the awareness of the inadequacy of our imagination in the dynamical case it comes from the awareness of our physical powerlessness in the face of nature's might. Essays in Kant's Aesthetics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. More specifically, they must be natural things the concept of which does not involve the idea of a purpose (§26, 252–253); this rules out animals, the concept of which is connected with the idea of biological function, but it apparently includes mountains and the sea (§26, 256). Weiskel, Thomas J., 1979. Kreines, J., 2005. Clewitt, R., 2010. In the case of the origin of particular organisms, Kant endorses a view (epigenesis) on which the emergence of an apparently new plant or animal is not just the expansion or unfolding of one which already existed in miniature (as on the preformationist view), but a natural process whereby a new living thing comes into being. Objections to the one-act approach have been raised by a number of commentators, in particular Allison, who partly endorses Ginsburg's criticisms of Guyer, but raises difficulties for her reading of §9 (2001, 113–115) and, in particular, rejects the self-referential understanding of judgments of beauty as "inherently implausible" (2001, 115). Kantian Aesthetics Pursued, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. They can be counted as purposive in this relative sense as long as the thing to whose existence they contribute is a living thing, and hence has inner purposiveness (this condition is stated most clearly at §82, 425). Lenoir's view is challenged in Richards (2000) and, more recently in Zammito (2012), which is also a useful source of references to recent literature on the topic. There are substantial differences among the various available English-language editions, in particular in the translation of certain frequently occurring terms, and these differences are reflected in variations in the terminology used in the secondary literature. Other useful discussions of Kant's views on the systematicity of nature are to be found in Horstmann (1989), Brandt (1989), Butts (1990), Friedman (1991 and 1992, ch. Allison, H., 1991. K., 1968. Criticisms have also been raised against various aspects of Kant's characterization of beauty in the *Analytic of the Beautiful*. "The Unity of Science and the Unity of Nature," Kant's Epistemology and Theory of Science, P. Kant makes the negative point (a version of which he had earlier argued at length in the Only Possible Argument for the Existence of God of 1763) that we can understand these arrangements without appeal to purposes. The assumption that nature is purposive for our cognitive faculties is not, strictly speaking, part of teleology, since the purposiveness at issue is subjective, and teleological judgments are concerned only with objective purposiveness (see e.g., FV II, 20–21; and FV II, 20–21). The free play thus manifests, in Kant's words, "free lawfulness" or "lawfulness without a law." But there is an apparent paradox in these characterizations which is left unaddressed by Kant's own largely metaphorical explanations. Zuckert also lays emphasis on Kant's identification of purposiveness as the "lawfulness of the contingent" (2007, pp. Moran, Richard., 2012. —, 2001a, 51–52). Makrilia (1990, ch. Kant's Critique of Teleology in Biological Explanation, Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. Kant's Aesthetics: The Roles of Form and Expression, Lanham, MD: University Press of America. The Cambridge edition contains excellent editorial notes aimed at a more specialized readership, and includes copious references to other relevant writings by Kant. In the Critique of Pure Reason, imagination is described as "synthesizing the manifold of intuition" under the governance of rules that are prescribed by the understanding; the outcome of this is cognitive perceptual experience of objects as having specific empirical features. Many commentators have taken the notion of mechanism to be equivalent to the notion of causality in time which figures in the Critique of Pure Reason, so that the principle of mechanism is equivalent to the causal principle which Kant takes himself to have proved in the Second Analogy. 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Although reflective judgment is exercised in both aesthetic and teleological judgment, Kant assigns a special role to its exercise in the aesthetic case, and specifically in judgments of beauty (Introduction VII, 193; FV XI, 243–244). This implies that the act of judging which precedes the pleasure must be one in which the subject takes her state of mind to be universally communicable, requiring us to identify with an activity of the faculty prior to that judgment. While Kant says that the concept or principle of judgment which mediates the transition between nature and freedom is that of the "purposiveness of nature," which could simply be understood as referring to nature's scientific comprehensibility (see Section 3.2 below), he also associates judgment in this context with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, making clear that it is not only judgment in the sense of empirical scientific enquiry, but also aesthetic judgment, which plays this bridging role. 182–189. I take it, then, that my pleasure stands in a "necessary" relation to the object, which it elicits, where the necessity here is that they were designed to account with those standards. The assessment of the objection, and of Kant's Deduction of Taste more generally, is complicated by a number of more fundamental interpretive issues, which are discussed in the next section. (For more on the objectivity of taste, see Section 2.3.5), 135–163; reprinted in Guyer (2005a). Judgment in the Critique of Judgment is described as having two roles or aspects: "determining" [bestimmend] and "reflecting" [

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